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The beginning of the celebrations of the centenary 
of Ukraine’s independence
Tadeusz A. Olszański
January 2018 saw the first celebrations commemorating the centenary of Ukraine’s fight for 
independence (1917–1921). The first two of these events, commemorating the declaration of 
independence (22 January 1918) and the battle of Kruty (29 January 1918), were surprisingly 
small-scale, especially with regard to the participation of Ukraine’s leadership in them. This 
may mean that the ruling elite has no concept of how to use the centenary to solidify its po-
litical position, also in the context of the presidential and parliamentary elections planned 
for 2019. At the same time, a profound shift in the narrative regarding the fight from a cen-
tury ago has been evident in the media reports and educational materials published by the 
Ukrainian Institute for National Remembrance (UINP). The emphasis is no longer placed on the 
armed struggle and the continuation of the leftist tradition of the government of the Ukrain-
ian People’s Republic; instead, priority is given to the efforts to build a state and create its 
institutions, including professional armed forces. The anarchist-revolutionary traditions are 
criticised, and the importance of order and discipline is highlighted.
There has been a revival of positive remem-
brances of hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi, an op-
ponent of revolutionary trends and a ‘found-
ing father’ of numerous institutions of cultural 
and academic life, some of which survived the 
collapse of independent Ukraine; until recent-
ly, he had been erased from society’s memo-
ry. This rehabilitation of him may be viewed as 
a response to a short-term demand from a state 
entangled in war and threatened by social life 
tumbling into anarchy, a state with persistently 
weak structures and institutions. However, con-
sidering that this new narrative, which has been 
prepared by the UINP and its collaborators, is 
being propagated in forms that are targeted 
mainly at teachers, there is no doubt that there 
is much more to it, and that a permanent mod-
ification to the nation’s historical tradition is at 
stake. This new narrative is focused on Ukraine 
alone (although not exclusively on Ukrainians: 
it comprises the Crimean Tatars and other eth-
nic minorities as well). Poland is presented as an 
enemy, albeit of secondary importance, and in-
formation regarding the 1920 Polish-Ukrainian 
alliance is being omitted and ignored.
In the upcoming months, subsequent centenar-
ies will be commemorated in Ukraine, including 
the centenary of the adoption of the national 
emblem, the introduction of the national cur-
rency, the recapture of Crimea and the creation 
of the Ukrainian Naval Forces. In November 
2018, celebrations to commemorate the cente-
nary of the establishment of the West Ukrainian 
People’s Republic and the beginning of the war 
with Poland over Lviv, will be organised, likely 
also at the state level. The celebrations com-
memorating the war, which will coincide with 
Polish initiatives to commemorate the same 
historical events, may trigger new disputes in 
bilateral relations.
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The celebrations of the centenary 
of proclamation of independence …
The official celebrations of the centenary of 
proclamation of the independence of the 
Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR), which hap-
pened when the Fourth Universal of the Ukraini-
an Central Council was adopted, and of the bat-
tle of Kruty, which was of symbolic significance 
for the Ukrainian fight for independence in the 
early twentieth century, were organised on 
a surprisingly small scale. In contrast to expec-
tations, no special session of Ukraine’s parlia-
ment was held, and no military parade or similar 
state-organised celebrations took place. During 
his meeting with the diplomatic corps on 16 
January, President Petro Poroshenko failed to 
even mention the centenary of independence. 
The main festive event was a gala held in the 
Ukrainian House, attended by parliamentari-
ans, bishops, diplomats and others prominent 
figures, during which the President delivered 
a speech1. He also laid flowers (unaccompanied 
by representatives of the military) at the statue 
of Mykhailo Hrushevskyi2, the only UNR leader 
to have a statue in Kyiv, as well as at the statues 
of the first victims of the Euromaidan (the anni-
versary of their deaths also falls on 22 January). 
The grassroots celebrations were limited to the 
traditional ‘chain of unity’ held on one of Kyiv’s 
1 http://www.president.gov.ua/news/vistup-preziden-
ta-ukrayini-na-urochistomu-zibranni-z-nagodi-45530
2 For basic information on the early 20th century activists 
discussed in the text see the Appendix.
bridges. However, the purpose of this event is 
to commemorate not the declaration of inde-
pendence but the proclamation (exactly a year 
later) of the unification of the UNR, , with the 
West Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZUNR), lo-
cated in Eastern Galicia. Since 1999, this event 
has been celebrated as the Day of Unity (sob-
ornost’). For their part, the residents of Kyiv on 
that day were more inclined to commemorate 
those killed during the Euromaidan. President 
Poroshenko’s speech in the Ukrainian House 
was mainly a eulogy to a strong state and 
a strong military, and to the unity of a nation 
facing a threat. The president criticised the so-
cialist nature of the UNR, the unending disputes 
among its leaders, the failure to take care of 
the military, including in particular the “de-
structive phenomenon of atamanship”, which 
in his view some would wish to revive in con-
temporary Ukraine. The president also reiter-
ated the opinion, which has been spreading in 
Ukraine for some time now, that “without 1917 
there would not have been a 1991” (i.e. the 
year in which Ukraine regained independence). 
It is worth noting that in speaking of Ukraine’s 
leaders at that time, Poroshenko mentioned 
hetman Skoropadskyi first and expressed his re-
spect for him. Only later did he mention Symon 
Petlura, albeit slightly ironically, referring to 
him as the author of the pamphlet entitled ‘The 
Moscow louse”3. The third historical figure the 
president mentioned was Nestor Makhno. The 
president pointed to him as a warning and an 
example of the ‘atamanship’ (anarchy) which 
threatened the state. On the one hand, the 
President’s speech was more focused on con-
temporary Ukraine than on the events from 
a century ago. On the other hand, it reflected 
the new historical narrative which is being pro-
moted by the Ukrainian Institute for National 
Remembrance (more on this later). This is not 
a sign of conservatism, but rather of the need 
3 A propaganda brochure targeting Ukrainian country 
people published in 1925 in Paris.
The celebrations of the centenary of in-
dependence gave the impression that 
Ukrainian politicians did not care much 
about this event. It seems that the main 
political actors do not see these celebra-
tions as an opportunity to win political 
capital.
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to focus all social forces around the structures 
of the state. This need is justified by the ongo-
ing war. It also favours those forces that oppose 
radical political and economic changes.
...and of the battle of Kruty
In contrast to expectations, the state did not 
commemorate the centenary of the battle of 
Kruty in a solemn manner. The president laid 
flowers on the graves of those killed in the war 
near the Orthodox church at Askold’s  Mound 
(in downtown Kyiv) and in the Lukyanovsky 
Cemetery. At the last moment, he decided not 
to take part in the celebrations in Kruty there-
by lowering the official status of the celebra-
tions held there. On the same day, Poroshenko 
named the Military Institute of Telecommunica-
tion and Digitisation after the Heroes of Kruty. 
The celebrations in Kruty were co-organised by 
the Ministry of Defence, but the minister him-
self did not attend them. The main element 
of these celebrations was the arrival from Kyiv 
on a special ‘unity train’ of around 400 pupils 
from military secondary schools from all over 
Ukraine. It is worth noting that national flags 
were the only flags flown during the event.
In Kyiv, historical reconstruction groups or-
ganised an event to commemorate the clash 
between republican troops and Bolshevik in-
surgent units in the Arsenal factory (which hap-
pened concurrently with the battle of Kruty). In 
the evening, the main grassroots celebrations 
took place: several thousand people attended 
a march in the centre of Kyiv, which culminated 
in the unveiling of a monument to the heroes of 
Kruty in Lviv Square. The monument is a plain 
cross carved out of stone and designed accord-
ing to Cossack tradition. It stands in contrast to 
the grandeur of the monuments to those killed 
in the ongoing war. At first glance, it is evident 
that this is a grassroots initiative, not one devised 
at the state or city level. During the event, aside 
from national flags, red and black flags were 
flown, which in Ukraine are increasingly often 
viewed as a symbol of the fight against external 
violence. Alongside this, a memorial plaque was 
set in the wall of the train station in Bakhmach 
to commemorate those who fought to defend it 
in January 1918 (the clashes with the Bolsheviks, 
which took place several days before the battle 
of Kruty, have not been included in the national 
historical narrative). 
The celebrations of the centenary of independ-
ence gave the impression that Ukrainian politi-
cians did not care much about this event. The 
political elite in Kyiv has been increasingly in-
terested in the preparations for the presiden-
tial and parliamentary elections scheduled  for 
2019. It seems that the main political actors do 
not view these celebrations as an opportunity 
to win political capital. Neither Poroshenko nor 
Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman or the oth-
er potential presidential candidates have shown 
any major interest in historical issues (unlike 
Viktor Yushchenko and Leonid Kuchma before 
him, albeit in different ways).
However, it cannot be ruled out that the his-
torical motive will be taken up later on during 
the electoral campaign (the presidential cam-
paign in particular). The new narrative regard-
ing the centenary of independence may pro-
mote Poroshenko as the ‘stabiliser of the state’ 
and the signals regarding the threat of anar-
chy may be interpreted as criticism targeting 
Yulia Tymoshenko, who may be one of his main 
counter-candidates. However, for the time be-
ing, both the government camp and the main 
opposition forces seem comfortable with the 
fact that the turn towards history is happening 
without their involvement, which enables them 
to use it (or not) depending on the situation.
At the same time, an active part of society has 
increasingly demonstrated not so much an in-
terest in history as a demand for a patriotic 
Reviving positive memories of Skoro-
padskyi means placing an emphasis on 
the peaceful building of the state, on 
law and order, on the state, rather than 
on society.
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narrative that would respond to the situation 
of a country which is waging a prolonged but 
not very intensive war. The young generation, 
which is shouldering the main burden of the 
defence effort, needs it in particular. And the 
war with Russia from a century ago, which 
was largely waged by voluntary and non-reg-
ular units, evokes rather obvious associations 
with the war which is currently taking place. 
The celebrations organised as part of unofficial 
initiatives (including by political parties that re-
main outside the present establishment) were 
on a smaller scale than those which the state 
could organise. However, their appeal is strong-
er because they are viewed as grassroots initi-
atives (there is a high level of distrust of state 
institutions in Ukraine). 
Building the new narrative 
of remembrance
So far, the official narrative regarding the events 
from before a century has been dominated by 
the history of the UNR and its leaders: Symon 
Petlura, Mykhailo Hrushevskyi and Volodymyr 
Vynnychenko. Emphasis has been placed almost 
exclusively on the armed struggle, rather than on 
the efforts to build a state. The Lviv-based ZUNR, 
itself an example of an efficient creation of civil-
ian and military structures, has remained on the 
sidelines, and the Ukrainian State (Ukrayinska 
derzhava) under hetman Skoropadskyi was com-
pletely excluded from the history of the fight for 
independence because it was viewed as ‘reaction-
ary’, ‘German-inspired’ (these opinions were for-
mulated back in Soviet times) and ‘pro-Russian’. 
In recent months, attempts have been made 
to revise this image of the past and to focus 
not on the war (which ultimately was lost) but 
on the efforts to create a state and its culture. 
These efforts resulted in the nation becoming 
solidified and – indirectly – in the Bolsheviks 
being forced to give their state a federal struc-
ture, which was tantamount with preserving 
a portion of the UNR’s heritage.
The Kyiv-based newspaper Den daily announced 
that 2018 would be the Year of the Hetmanate, 
and named hetman Skoropadskyi as the patron 
of Ukrainian liberalism4. This should be viewed 
as bizarre – a conservative aristocrat who 
viewed the Ukrainian state as a hereditary mon-
archy is definitely not suited to be the patron of 
liberals. However, he is an excellent patron for 
promoters of the state, because almost all the 
Ukrainian institutions that survived the fall of 
independence were created during his rule and 
under his patronage.
The creation of the new narrative is most evi-
dent in the methodological materials for teach-
ers prepared in recent weeks by the Ukrainian 
Institute for National Remembrance5. On the 
list entitled ‘One hundred faces of the Ukraini-
an revolution’ Petlura was only ranked twenti-
eth. He was outdistanced not only by Yevhen 
Petrushevych, the president of the ZUNR, but 
also even by Dmytro Vitovskyi, who was com-
mander of its military for a short period. The 
4 For example see Ігор Сюндюков, «Заборонена» історія, 
День, 19 January 2018, https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/po-
drobyci/zaboronena-istoriya, accessed 23 January 2018. 
On subsequent days the newspaper regularly published 
history-related materials for the general public dedicat-
ed to the hetman and his state. 
5 100 облич Української революції, http://www.memory.
gov.ua/sites/default/files/100_oblich_0.pdf; methodo-
logical guidelines regarding this material: http://www.
memory.gov.ua/news/institut-pidgotuvav-ilyustrativ-
nii-proekt-100-oblich-ukrainskoi-revolyutsii; the brochure 
100 років боротьби: Українська революція 1917–1921 
(One hundred years of fighting: the Ukrainian revolution 
1917–1921), unr.memory.gov.ua/metodichni-materiali/
nashi-vidannya-broshura-100-rokiv-borotbi-ukrains-
ka-revolyutsiya-1917-1921, all accessed 1 February 2018. 
For more methodological materials: unr.memory.gov.ua/
metodichni-materiali/metodichni-materiali. When print-
ed in high resolution, some of these materials can be dis-
played as ready exhibitions.
On the day of the centenary of the procla-
mation of the UNR’s independence, a bill 
was submitted to Ukrainian parliament on 
restoring the legal continuity between the 
UNR and contemporary Ukraine. It should 
be expected that it will be included in the 
agenda of the parliamentary session in 
spring 2018.
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symbolic figure who is most popular today, 
Hrushevskyi, was ranked first, and hetman 
Skoropadskyi was ranked second. Mykola 
Mikhnovskyi was ranked third; in 1917 he was 
one of the few consistent independence fight-
ers, but his role in the process of building the 
UNR was rather insignificant. Vynnychenko, 
the actual leader of the UNR in 1917–18, was 
only ranked fourth. Fifth place was taken by 
Borys Martos, back then the UNR’s minister 
of agriculture, and sixth place by Serhiy Ye-
fremov, a proponent of Ukraine’s autonomy; 
in January 1918 he actually opposed the plan 
to declare independence. Aside from politicians 
and military commanders, the list included nu-
merous social activists, academics, writers and 
artists (including a large group of theatre di-
rectors and performers). The latter group also 
included those who accepted the new reality 
post-1921, avoided the repression of the 1930s 
and were included in the pantheon of Sovi-
et art, such as the great filmmaker Oleksandr 
Dovzhenko and the well-known poet Pavlo 
Tychyna. This is an important confirmation of 
the fact that the anathema of de-Communisa-
tion does not apply to those who were promi-
nent artists and scientists in Soviet times. 
The process discussed here entails much more 
than just a shift of emphases; it entails a change 
in the narrative. To restore Skoropadskyi’s rep-
utation means placing the emphasis on the 
peaceful building of the state, on law and order 
(which the hetman managed to maintain for 
some six months, largely due to the protection 
offered by German and Austrian troops), and 
also on the regular (and not the revolutionary) 
army. Thus the emphasis is placed on the state, 
not on society. There has also been a move 
away from the tendency to place the country 
people and the agrarian question at the centre 
of the events of that time; instead, the urban 
elites have been restored to their former place 
in history. Actually, this is tantamount to the 
eradication of Soviet schemes of thinking about 
history. The process of shaping the new nar-
rative has just begun. Previous actions by the 
Ukrainian Institute for National Remembrance 
indicate that its leadership is oriented towards 
long-term activities: not on ‘re-educating’ the 
present society, but rather on shaping the new 
generation. This is why on the occasion of ma-
jor anniversaries the Institute publishes meth-
odological materials for teachers6, as well as 
infographics which appeal to the young gen-
eration better than essays. In recent months it 
has been distributing a board game dedicated 
to the fight for independence, free of charge. 
The place of Poland in the new narrative 
of remembrance
From Poland’s point of view, the main ele-
ments in Polish-Ukrainian relations in 1917–21 
are the Piłsudski–Petlura alliance of 1920 and 
the preceding war between the Republic of Po-
land, which at that time was reviving its own 
structures, and the newly created ZUNR. Mean-
while, from the perspective of contemporary 
Ukraine, both of these events are of secondary 
importance: the failed 1920 spring campaign 
(the so-called Kyiv Offensive) was merely an 
episode, and the price of the alliance was very 
high, as Petlura agreed to cede Eastern Galicia 
and Volhynia to Poland (the 1921 Polish-Soviet 
6 A methodological guidebook regarding the Ger-
man-perpetrated crime in Babi Yar was published al-
most concurrently with the publications mentioned in 
the text; www.memory.gov.ua/news/u-kievi-prezen-
tuyut-posibnik-dlya-vchiteliv, accessed 1 February 2018.
In November 2018, the local government 
in Eastern Galicia will definitely organise 
celebrations of the centenary of the ZUNR 
(which will also be the centenary of the 
conflict with Poland); these will inevitably 
coincide with Polish celebrations of the 
centenary of the defence of Lviv.
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peace treaty only confirmed these decisions). 
This may be one of the reasons why Petlura is 
being pushed into the background today. Simi-
larly, the 1918–19 war over Lviv does not belong 
to the mainstream of Ukrainian thinking about 
the nation’s history: at present, Ukraine’s ene-
my is not Poland.
These methodological materials hardly ever 
mention the alliance with Poland. The ‘One 
hundred years of fighting’ brochure contains 
a short passage regarding “the Warsaw ac-
cord of 21 April 1920” interpreted as “breaking 
Ukraine’s international isolation” and winning 
“military support […] in exchange for territorial 
concessions”. Another section of the brochure 
mentions the fact that in Poland an infantry 
division under General Bezruchko was being 
formed, which “entered Kyiv alongside the 
Polish troops”. Another section of the brochure 
claims that “in the autumn of 1920 the UNR 
army was abandoned by its allies...”, where-
as the preceding passage mentions “...the 
Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918–19”. The latter 
event is referred to as “Poland’s aggression”. 
A biographical note on Vyacheslav Lypynskyi 
in ‘One hundred faces...’ states that he “was 
a descendant of an old noble family” but fails 
to mention that the family was Polish (the 
Lipiński family came from Mazovia). 
Bezruchko’s biographical note in ‘One hundred 
faces...’ contains a blatant historical falsehood. 
It says that “historians view him as a Ukrainian 
who saved Warsaw from the Bolsheviks during 
the Miracle on the Vistula […]. The heroic de-
fence of Zamość during the Polish-Soviet war 
brought him his greatest fame. The city’s de-
fenders managed to stop Budyonny’s cavalry 
for two days, which enabled the Poles to win 
the battle near Warsaw”. In fact, the defence 
of Zamość against Budyonny, which indeed was 
led by Bezruchko, took place on 28–31 August, 
which means that it could not have affected the 
result of the battle of Warsaw, which took place 
much earlier. The thesis regarding Bezruchko’s 
participation in saving Warsaw, which has been 
promoted in Ukrainian historiography and jour-
nalism for many years, is likely to become an 
important element of Ukraine’s historical policy 
in the next few years.
The historical continuity 
of the Ukrainian state
One of the goals of 2015’s de-Communisa-
tion laws was to restore the legal continuity 
between the UNR and contemporary Ukraine. 
Back then, the relevant section was removed 
at the last moment, one possible reason be-
ing that it was contained in the preamble and 
omitted the formal and legal aspect of the 
matter. The expectation was that this section 
of the law would be withdrawn for only a short 
time, and would be restored in a more favour-
able situation. Indeed, on the day of the cente-
nary of the UNR’s declaration of independence, 
a relevant bill was submitted to the Ukrainian 
parliament7 by a group of MPs from the na-
tionalist Svoboda party. For the time being, it 
is not known whether the bill was consulted 
with the UINP and whether it will be the only 
bill on this matter. However, it should be ex-
pected that this topic will be included in the 
agenda of the parliamentary session in spring 
2018. Pursuant to the bill, Ukraine is the le-
gal successor to the UNR, after the collapse of 
which “between 18 March 1921 and 23 August 
1991 it had the status of an occupied country”. 
This legal succession is only symbolic: the bill 
states that all international accords signed by 
the UNR (including the 1920 Warsaw accord 
pursuant to which Eastern Galicia and Volhynia 
were ceded  to Poland) lost their legal validity 
on 18 March 1921 (i.e. when the Treaty of Riga 
was signed). The bill also confirmed the valid-
ity of the law on Ukraine’s legal succession of 
12 September 1991. So, in legal terms nothing 
7 Олег Ярославович Тягнибок, Україна – 
правонаступниця УНР. Проект закону; http://blogs.
pravda.com.ua/authors/tiahnybok /5a65f7a43a75a/, 
accessed 22 January 2018.
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has changed: the international treaties and in-
ternal legal acts adopted by the Ukrainian SSR 
remain in force, even if the UkrSSR is considered 
a structure of occupation. The only change is in 
the symbolic identity of the state – and as such 
it will be very important. 
Summary
The anniversaries of the successive events re-
lated to Ukraine’s fight for independence will 
continue until the autumn of 2020. However, 
the minor involvement of the state authori-
ties in the celebrations surrounding the most 
important of these events, i.e. the proclama-
tion of independence, suggests that the cele-
brations of other anniversaries (more often of 
failures than victories) may be treated likewise. 
Due to their present political significance, the 
spring 2018 anniversaries of the Ukrainian army 
(in cooperation with the German army) seizing 
eastern Ukraine and Crimea may be among the 
few exceptions.
The anniversary celebrations that will be or-
ganised in 2019 will be strongly affected by 
the dual electoral campaign. At this point, 
it is difficult to predict how the main actors 
will wish to employ (or avoid) them. Celebra-
tions will certainly be organised to commem-
orate the centenary of Ukraine’s unification 
(in January 2019), and in March 2019 Ukraine 
will be faced with the problem of remem-
bering the anti-Jewish pogroms carried out 
during the war for independence, because 
of the centenary of the biggest such pogrom 
(in Proskuriv, now Khmelnytskyi). 
In November 2018, the local government in East-
ern Galicia will definitely organise celebrations 
of the centenary of the ZUNR (which will also 
be the centenary of the conflict with Poland); 
these will inevitably coincide with Polish cele-
brations of the centenary of the defence of Lviv 
(some of which will be organised in the city), 
and will also revive the dispute regarding the 
question as to which of the then warring sides 
in the war over Eastern Galicia was the defender 
and which was the aggressor. In the remaining 
part of the country (particularly in Kyiv) grass-
roots celebrations should be expected (organ-
ised mainly by nationalist groups). However, the 
scale of the national government’s involvement 
in the celebrations will depend on the state 
of Polish-Ukrainian relations at that time. Al-
though this centenary has been included in the 
annual official list of celebrations8, it is just one 
of fifty such events: the experience of previous 
years indicates that many such anniversaries re-
ceive little attention. 
Regardless of the dynamic of the official cel-
ebrations, a new way of thinking about the 
events of a century ago is increasingly evident: 
the emphasis is being shifted from defending 
the state to building the state, which also in-
cludes developing the national culture from 
heroism to professionalism (including in mili-
tary issues). Moreover, what is being stressed 
is the fact that Ukraine fought for its independ-
ence on its own (the importance of the alliances 
with Germany, and later Poland, is being omit-
ted), and the war for independence that broke 
out in January 1917 lasted as long as until 1991.
8 Resolution by Ukraine’s Supreme Council of 8 February 
2018. (w1c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511 
=62855, access 9 February 2018). It is noteworthy that 
the note on the website of the Ukrainian Institute for 
National Remembrance regarding this resolution (www.
memory.gov.ua/news/rada-ukhvalila-perelik-pamyat-
nikh-dat-i-yuvileiv-u-2018-rotsi, accessed 9 February 
2018) only mentions four anniversaries: the centenary 
of the adoption of the national emblem, of the intro-
duction of the national currency and the recapture of 
Crimea, and the four hundredth anniversary of hetman 
Sahaidachny’s attack on Muscovy (an element of the 
war between the Republic of Poland and Russia).
8OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 261
Historical figures mentioned in the text
Marko Bezruchko (1883–1944), a Russian army officer, from 1918 a Ukrainian army officer, in 1920 
he led the defence of Zamość, and spent his later life in exile in Poland. 
Oleksandr Dovzhenko (1894–1956), participant in the fight for independence at the beginning of 
1918. Post-1920, a filmmaker, one of the most prominent figures in Soviet cinema in the 1920s, con-
sidered one of the masters of world cinema. 
Mykhailo Hrushevskyi (1886–1934), Ukraine’s most prominent historian, in 1917–18 president of 
the Ukrainian Central Council, frequently and mistakenly considered Ukraine’s first president. In 
1919–24 in exile in Czechoslovakia, later in the USSR. 
Serhiy Yefremov (1876–1939), outstanding literary scholar, in 1917–18 a member of the executive 
body of the Ukrainian Central Council, opponent of Ukraine’s declaration of independence. In spring 
1918 he withdrew from public life to pursue an academic career. In 1930, he was arrested by the 
NKVD, died in prison. 
Vyacheslav Lypynskyi aka Wacław Lipiński (1882–1931), a Polish landowner, Ukrainian by choice, 
political activist, creator of Ukrainian conservatism, post-1920 in exile in Austria and Germany, colla-
borator of hetman Skoropadskyi.
Borys Martos (1879–1977), activist and promoter of the cooperative movement, author of the Ukra-
inian agrarian reform, in 1919 held the office of prime minister of the UNR and other posts. Post-
1920, in exile in Germany, Czechoslovakia and the USA. 
Mykola Mikhnovskyi (1873–1924), columnist, author of the pamphlet ‘Samostiyna Ukrayina’ [In-
dependent Ukraine] (1900), in which he was the first to formulate the demand for Ukraine’s inde-
pendence. In summer 1917 he organised Ukrainian armed forces (modelled on the structures of the 
tsar’s army); later he withdrew from public life and remained in Ukraine. 
Symon Petlura (1879–1926), initiator of the creation of the new Ukrainian armed forces (not mo-
delled on the structures of the tsar’s army), the leader of the uprising against hetman Skoropadskyi 
in autumn 1918, and later head of the UNR Directorate. In spring 1920, he entered into an alliance 
with Poland, under which the state borders were delineated and later confirmed in the Polish-Soviet 
peace treaty. Post-1920, in exile in Poland and France. He was assassinated by the NKVD. 
Yevhen Petrushevych (1863–1940), a Galician politician, member of parliament of the Austrian Em-
pire, president and later dictator of the ZUNR, head of its government in exile (until 1923), spent his 
later life in exile in Austria and Germany. 
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Pavlo Skoropadskyi (1873–1945), descendant of a prominent elite Cossack family, professional 
serviceman in the Russian army, from 1917 a proponent of the Ukrainian national movement. Be-
tween April and December 1918, Hetman of the Ukrainian State (this was the name of the hetman-
-led state; the name and the system of the UNR had been abandoned), spent his later life in exile in 
Germany, leader of the conservative wing of the Ukrainian émigré community.
Pavlo Tychyna (1891–1967), poet and activist in the amateur artistic movement, author of several 
poems dedicated to Ukraine’s fight for independence (including the well-known ‘At Askold’s Mound 
/ They were buried...’ dedicated to the heroes of the battle of Kruty). He did not take part in the fight 
for independence. Post-1920, a prominent poet and social activist, a deputy to the Supreme Council 
of the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR. 
Dmytro Vitovskyi (1887–1919), officer of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (a voluntary formation in the 
Austrian army), organiser of the Ukrainian uprising in Eastern Galicia in November 1918, the first 
commander of the ZUNR’s armed forces. He was killed in an aviation accident. 
Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880–1951), columnist, writer and socialist movement activist, 
the de facto leader of the Ukrainian Central Council, in 1917–18 head of the Central Secretariat 
(the government) of Ukraine. Post-1918, in exile in France.
